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Indigency and the Right to Counsel-Allen v.
People, 404 P.2d 266 (Colo. 1965). The defendant,
accused of aggravated robbery and free on bond,
appeared in the trial court without counsel. Under
questioning by the court, he related an effort to
obtain counsel which had been unsuccessful be-
cause the attorney had demanded a retainer be-
yond the defendant's financial means. Defendant
told the court that he was making $150 a month,
had no family obligations, and was furnished board
and room. The trial judge told defendant that he
could not appoint counsel under these circum-
stances and continued the case to allow defendant
to obtain private counsel. In all, the case was con-
tinued three times. Each time defendant was
warned that he would have to hire an attorney.
Each time he indicated that he could, and would,
comply with the court's order. At a later appear-
ance the defendant told the court that he had lost
his first job, found a second, but was then working
at a third in Utah. The court made no further
inquiry into defendant's financial status.
After the last continuance, the case was tried
without counsel representing the defendant.
Following a conviction, defendant appealed on the
ground that the court had erred in failing to ap-
point an attorney for him although he was "in-
digent" at the time of his trial. The conviction was
affirmed.
Allen is one of the first cases to discuss what has
been called the trial judge's continuing duty to
determine the financial status of an unrepresented
defendant. The opinion of the Supreme Court of
Colorado unequivocally rejects the notion that
such a duty rests upon a court where, as here, the
defendant, in his first appearance, appears fi-
nancially able to retain private counsel.
"The intent of the rule [requiring appointed
counsel]," the court said, "is that after the court
has informed the accused of his right to counsel,
some kind of showing must be made by the de-
fendant as to his indigence.... The rule does not
require the trial court to maintain a continuing
vigilance over the financial affairs of one accused
of crime in order to ferret out his poverty poten-
tial... [and] the burden rested upon the defendant
to apprise the court of any change in circumstances
resulting in indigency." (Emphasis added.)
In answer to the argument that the fact of
defendant's changes of employment should have
put "the court on notice that further inquiry
should be made of his financial ability to obtain
counsel," the court commented that, "The de-
fendant is not entitled to a presumption of poverty.
The mere fact that he lost one job and obtained
another does not warrant the inference that he was
making less money. * * * It is just as reasonable
to suppose that his reason for changing jobs was to
improve his financial condition."
Comment: Admittedly, the question of what
criminal defendants are "indigent" and therefore
entitled by the constitution to the appointment of
counsel without cost is one of the most difficult
facing trial judges in the administration of criminal
justice today. Whether indigency is a state in
which a defendant has no money, some money,
enough to keep himself and his family, not enough
to employ counsel, or enough to employ a lawyer,
but not a really good lawyer, is a question which
has been left unanswered by the decisions requiring
the appointment of counsel when indigency has
been found. Trial judges must also wrestle with the
problems posed by defendants who spend their
available funds for bail and then claim indigency,
with defendants who have affluent relatives willing
to provide funds for bail, investigators, and the
like, but not for counsel or transcripts on appeal.
And the defendant who owns material possessions
not necessities, but, at the same time, in present-
day America, not luxuries, also presents unique
problems. Must the family sell the television set,
the automobile or the freezer in order to obtain
funds to hire counsel? And yet, while it is important
to ensure that the administration of criminal
justice, already costly, does not impose unjustified
burdens upon the taxpayer, one reads opinions like
Allen with uneasy feelings.
The Colorado court may be correct in holding
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that there is no continuing duty upon a trial judge
to ferret out a defendant's "poverty potential"
without a showing of indigency, or at least changed
circumstances inferring the possibility of indigency,
after it has been initially determined that the
appointment of counsel is neither necessary nor
allowable. The problem with Allen, however, is
the initial assumption of the court that defendant
was able to hire counsel before any change in
circumstances.
The opinion recites that the defendant originally
told the court that he would not obtain counsel
because "I didn't figure I needed one." The court
then told Allen he thought that was a "foolish"
attitude and that "the Court feels that you should
have an attorney." To this the defendant re-
sponded that "I can't afford an attorney, so I'll go
without one." The judge then said "The court can
appoint an attorney for you if you have no funds,
property, or anything of that kind." (Emphasis
added.) The defendant replied that he was em-
ployed and was paid a salary of $150 a month plus
room and board, but that his one attempt to hire
private counsel had failed for lack of a sufficient
retainer. The court then said that "if you are
working and have $150.00 a month coming in,
this Court cannot bind the taxpayers of this
county with attorney fees in your behalf. I would
suggest that you get an attorney. I'm sure that
you could find one. However, that's up to you."
So far as the opinion, reveals, there was no further
discussion of indigency.
While as an abstract legal proposition a de-
fendant may be required to show indigency in
order to qualify for the appointment of counsel,
it is one thing to place a burden of evidentiary
persuasion upon a defendant represented by
counsel, and quite another to place it upon an
uncounseled defendant. Though defendant Allen
was told that counsel could be appointed if he had
no property or funds, there is at least serious ques-
tion about the validity of that standard. And the
trial court told Allen that he could not have ap-
pointed counsel because he was employed at a
salary of $150.00 a month without any further
examination of the ordinary monthly disposition
of those funds in support of the defendant, his
debts, if any, or other financial circumstances,
except for the conclusion by the court that he had
no "family obligations."
The question of a continuing duty of inquiry
aside, courts should not make initial assumptions
of solvency upon the tenuous facts revealed by the
Allen opinion. And it may be time that courts,
now caught up in the new and difficult problems of
determining indigency, reconsider whether the
burden of proof in these cases ought to be thrown
upon defendants who appear in court without
counsel.
No Free Transcripts for Misde'eanants-City
of Toledo v. Smith, 209 N.E.2d 410 (Ohio 1965).
The defendant was convicted of being drunk and
disorderly and resisting arrest. Upon his applica-
tion to be provided with a free transcript of the
evidence heard at the trial in order to prepare an
appeal, the trial judge found that "the case was
one in which a narrative bill of exceptions [ap-
parently a statement of facts prepared by a
litigant] would adequately exemplify the errors
claimed," and offered "to assist in the preparation
of such a narrative bill of exceptions" in place of
a court reporter's transcript which would cost
$350. This offer was refused by defendant, who
was in fact indigent, and the question then raised
upon appeal was whether "in every misdemeanor
case an indigent defendant is entitled to a bill of
exceptions, including a complete transcription of
the stenographer's notes at public expense."
(Emphasis added.) The Supreme Court of Ohio
decided that the answer to the question was "No"
and affirmed.
Distinguishing Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12,
upon which defendant relied, the court held that
that opinion did not even apply to all felony cases
(presumably, the court meant that Griffin does
not require a court reporter's transcript of the
evidence to be furnished where adequate alterna-
tives are available), and, if it did, it applied only
to felony cases. "This seems to us," the court said,
"to draw the line where it should be drawn. The
problem is that the cost of a transcript and a bill
of exceptions, as well as other costs of defense, are
considerations which confront the accused in all
cases. To remove this consideration in misdemeanor
cases only as to indigents is certainly not equal
justice. It is to say that indigents may frivolously
appeal while others must consider the costs."
Comment: The court's answer to defendant's
argument not only proves too little, it proves too
much.
First, since it is undoubtedly true that, as the
court holds, "the cost of a transcript and a bill of
exceptions, as well as other costs of defense, are
considerations which confront the accused in all
cases" (emphasis added), that would seem to be
an argument for the extension of free transcripts
[Vol. 56
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to convicted defendants in all cases. Certainly, it is
not a justification for the refusal to gixe free tran-
scripts to convicted misdemeanants while routinely
supplying them to convicted felons.
Second, it may not be "equal justice" to furnish
free transcripts only to indigent defendants while
requiring all other defendants to pay for them.
One of the most difficult problems now faced by
society in the administration of the criminal law
to provide for the defendant who does not have
the funds to obtain the kind of lawyer, investiga-
tion aids, expert testimony, and appeal that the
wealthy may obtain, and yet is not impecunious
enough to qualify for appointed counsel. It is not a
proper answer to this dilemma, however, to deny a
needed transcript to an indigent because a person
who is not indigent foregoes appeal on account of
the cost.
Third, a holding extending the right to a free
transcript to misdemeanants is not to say, as the
court says, "that indigents may frivolously appeal
while others must consider the costs." The Su-
preme Court of the United States, in Griffin or any
other case, has not said that the state must bear
the cost of frivolous appeals. And, more im-
portantly, there was no finding by the court in
the instant case that the appeal was frivolous.
There may well be considerations which would
constitutionally justify drawing the line for free
transcripts, or free counsel, between felons and
misdemeanants, especially if the rationale of
Griffin and later cases is pitched more upon a due
process, and not equal protection, foundation. The
reasons put forth by the Supreme Court of Ohio,
however, in support of its refusal to supply indigent
misdemeanants with transcripts in all cases are in-
sufficient, though, because the defendant here re-
fused the offer of a narrative bill of exceptions
which might have been adequate to carry his ap-
peal (the court did not pass upon this point, but
assumed that the narrative bill would have been
adequate), the result may be correct.
Denial of Bail on Appeal--Colvecchio v. McGet-
trick, 208 N.E.2d 741 (Ohio 1965). Defendants
were convicted of burglary and larceny and ap-
pealed their convictions to the court of appeals.
Bail pending appeal was denied by both the trial
court and the court of appeals and defendants
then brought an original action for habeas corpus
in the supreme court in an effort to obtain bail.
Relief was denied.
In support of their petitions for bail defendants
argued that they were "long-time residents of
Cleveland, that they are married and have children,
and that they were under bail prior to their con-
victions and appeared when they were required to
do so ... [consequently,] there is no reason to
believe that if they were released on bail they
would abscond" and, as the supreme court con-
ceded, there were "undoubtedly sound grounds
for petitioners' appeals."
Replying to this argument, the state proved
that each defendant had been previously convicted
of a felony, that they were considered to be "pro-
fessional" criminals by the Cleveland police de-
partment, associated "with known criminals", and
had no known occupations. The state also showed
that one of the defendants had been caught in an
act of burglary while awaiting trial in the instant
case and was then under indictment in Florida for
burglary and safe tampering.
The supreme court found that the "possibility
that the person seeking bail may abscond during
the time he is at large is only one of the factors
which must be taken into consideration in granting
or denying bail. The conduct of an accused in
relation to the possibility of his committing further
crimes while at large on bail may well enter into
the consideration of the court." (Emphasis added.)
Comment: From the prosecutor's standpoint,
the problem of explaining to the public why it is
that criminals are repeatedly freed on bail, commit
new crimes, are bailed, and then are caught com-
mitting still further crimes is extraordinarily
difficult. Especially is this true when all of this
occurs before the original indictment is tried (and
the accused has been responsible for the delay)
and it appears that a bailed defendant is caught in
the vicious circle of committing crimes to pay
again and again for lawyers' and bondsmens' fees
in the first, second, and even third cases. (See
GoL FARE, RANsom: A CRiTiQuE oF THE AmERI-
CAN BAiL SYsT:EM (1965); Bail Under Scruliny,
The New York Times, Sept. 12, 1965.) The courts
have repeatedly held, however, that the constitu-
tional right to bail pending trial is absolute (save,
in some states, in murder cases) and cannot be
denied or revoked upon the commission of other
crimes by the accused. Bail pending appeal, how-
ever, is another matter, since this is not a right
within the constitutional guarantee of bail, and,
as the Ohio Supreme Court holds in the ColaveccHo
case, may be denied if the evidence supports an
assumption that the accused will abuse his freedom
by committing other crimes pending an appeal
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from the original conviction. See also Coleman v.
McGettrick, 207 N.E.2d 552 (Ohio 1965).
State Court Rejects Wong Sun-Dailey v.
State, 212 A.2d 257 (Md. 1965). Responding to a
burglar alarm, a police officer and an agent of the
alarm company entered the premises of an Ameri-
can Express office and found that a window in the
rear had been broken and a bar sawed through.
In an areaway outside the window, the police
officer found a man's coat, with a case containing
two keys in the pocket, along with a kit of tools.
Reasoning that the person who had left the keys
lived in a rooming house in the vicinity of the
burglary, the police proceeded to fit the larger key
to the outside doors of various rooming houses in
the neighborhood and, about an hour and a half
later, found "that it fitted the door of 115 W.
Mulberry Street, about two or three blocks from
the scene of the crime." Since the other key was
stamped with the number 5, the police went to
that room, the key unlocked the door, and inside
the room the police found defendant who asked,
"How did you find me so fast?" Arrested and taken
to the station, defendant made a number of
incriminating oral admissions which, at the trial,
he sought to suppress as the fruits of his unlawful
arrest and detention. Affirming the conviction, the
Court of Appeals of Maryland agreed that the
arrest was unlawful but refused to find that the
admissions were incompetent as evidence.
Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, argued
defendant, holds that confessions or admissions
which are made while a defendant is in custody
following an illegal arrest must be suppressed.
The Maryland court held, however, that "Wong
Sun does not control prosecutions in State courts,
and that the rule of the Supreme Court, as well as
that of Maryland, is that the critical test of ad-
missibility of a confession is whether it was in fact
voluntarily made."
Comment: Compare the recent holding of the
Supreme Court of California in People v. Bilder-
bach, 401 P.2d 921, 926-927 (Cal. 1965). "Clearly,
the United States Supreme Court test in Wong
Sun relating to evidence excludable as the product
of an illegal search and seizure applies to the
states... [and]... statements... voluntarily ren-
dered ... are not exempt from attack on constitu-
tional grounds if they are the product of an illegal
search." However, the court, noting cases from
other jurisdictions following the rationale of
Dailey, was careful to say that "We do not pass
on any questions involving the admissibility of
statements given by an accused after he has been
illegally arrested." 401 P.2d at 926, n. 5 (Emphasis
added.)
Obscenity, Search and Seizure, and the Proof
of Scienter-State v. Mazes, 209 N.E.2d 496 (Ct.
App., Ohio 1965). Defendant was convicted for
the possession of an obscene book entitled "Orgy
Club." On appeal he contended, inter alia, that the
state had not proved scienter, i.e., that he was
aware of the nature or contents of the book, and
that it had been illegally seized by the police at
the time of his arrest. The conviction was affirmed
by the court of appeals.
In answer to defendant's argument that the
state had not proved scienter, the appellate court
noted that the book was found by police in a rack
labelled "adults only," and that the tag "obviously
demonstrates a conscious classification of material
on the part of the merchant." "In addition to this,"
the court said, "the exhibit was found in the midst
of others [bearing] equally exotic titles and jackets
announcing with crystal clarity that this is the sex,
sin and sadism department." Although the court
recognized that "the problem of the book dealer in
attempting to screen the extensive output offered
him for display and sale is ... a difficult one," it
concluded that "a fifteen second reading either
of the back cover or the front page of 'Orgy Club'
... [would] indicate an appeal to pruriency as the
dominant theme."
The court also found that the officers could
properly seize the book without warrant at the time
of defendant's arrest since "they took the book
in good faith as contraband after examination and
after a determination that its possession then and
there constituted a felony in being."
Comment: See also State v. Vollmar, 389 S.W.2d
20 (Mo. 1965) and Abstracts of Recent Cases, 56
J. CRwmr. L., C. & P.S. 338-339 (1965).
Possession of Narcotic Residue Not Illegal-
People v. Sullivan, 44 Cal. Reptr. 524 (Cal. App.
1965). Defendant was found guilty of the unlawful
possession of heroin and on appeal he contended
that "the quantity of heroin seized was insufficient
to sustain a conviction. . . ." The California
Appellate court agreed and reversed the convic-
tion.
The evidence showed that the police had found a
narcotics "kit" in defendant's room. The kit con-
sisted of "a blue plastic case containing a syringe,
an extra bulb, an extra syringe, a match cover
folded over to protect the needle, a measuring
spoon, and an ordinary kitchen spoon." A police
[Vol. 56
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chemist testified at the trial that "there was a
residue on the spoons and the residue contained
heroin. The residue on the spoons was visible to
the naked eye, he stated, but the heroin crystals
themselves were detectable only through chemical
testing and by microscopic observation."
The court held that the "powder had been lique-
fied and the residue which remained was different
in form from the original substance." In addition,
the court noted, the defendant, at the time of
arrest, did not seem to be "aware of the heroin...
[and it] ... 'is not scientific measurement and de-
tection which is the ultimate test of the known pos-
session of a narcotic, but rather the awareness of
the defendant of the presence of the narcotic.
* * * The presence of the narcotic must be reflected
in such form as reasonably imputes knowledge to
the defendant.'"
In answer to the state's argument that de-
fendant's admission that he had recently used
narcotics with the kit meant that "he knew or
should have known that a residue of heroin would
remain on the spoons," the court held that under
this reasoning every defendant under the influence
of narcotics at the time of his arrest could be con-
victed of "possession of a narcotic, since he must
have had possession of the narcotic in the recent
past in order to come under its influence." This was
obviously not the intent of the legislature, the
court held, since the offenses of possession of
narcotics paraphernalia and being under the
influence of narcotics had been made misdemeanors,
while possession of narcotics was punishable as a
felony.
"We conclude," the court said, "that possession
of a minute crystalline residue of narcotic not in-
tended for consumption or sale and useless for
either of these purposes is insufficient evidence to
sustain a conviction for known possession of a
narcotic."
ThePointer Case and the Confrontation Clause
-Franklin. v. State, 212 A.2d 279(Md.1965).
Following a sale of narcotics to an undercover
police officer in a transaction arranged by a police
informer, the defendant was convicted of the
offense of sale and appealed on the ground that it
was a violation of the confrontation clause of the
federal constitution, made applicable to the states
in Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400 and Douglas v.
Alabama, 380 U.S. 415 (See Abstracts of Recent
Cases, 56 J. Crim. L., C. & P.S. 335-336 (1965)),
to allow the informer to claim the privilege against
self-incrimination when called as a witness by the
defense. The Court of Appeals of Maryland re-
jected the argument and affirmed.
Defendant reasoned that since the confrontation
clause was binding upon the states and the
Supreme Court, in Pointer and Douglas, had held
that the "right to cross-examine is inherent in the
right of the accused to be confronted with the
witnesses against him in a criminal case," the
failure of the court to compel the informer to
testify after he had invoked his privilege against
self-incrimination was a denial of the right to
"cross-examine" and hence a violation of the
constitution.
In rejecting defendant's claim, the court dis-
tinguished Pointer and Douglas on the ground that
what the Supreme Court did in those cases was
merely to "prohibit the use of accusatory testimony
of a witness wherever it is shown that the accused
was not given an opportunity to cross-examine the
witness who gave it. ... " Those cases, said the
court, did not hold "that the right of confrontation
and cross-examination is paramount to the right
of refusing to incriminate oneself." Since the court
found in the instant case that "there was sub-
stantial reason for the witness to refuse to give
evidence that might incriminate him" and since
"the informer was called as a witness by the ap-
pellant instead of by the State" and had, in fact,
given no testimony for the state, "it is clear that
no right of the appellant was violated."
Pennsylvania Limits Escobedo Rule-Comton..
wealth v. Senk, 212 A.2d 222 (Pa. 1965). Defendant
was convicted of the crime of murder and sentenced
to death. On appeal he claimed that his confession
had been admitted in evidence against him in
violation of the rule of Escobedo v. Illinois, 378
U.S. 478, since he had not intelligently waived his
privilege against self-incrimination and had not
been informed of his right to counsel during the
interrogation process leading to the giving of the
confession. The conviction and sentence were
affirmed.
The record established that two days before
defendant gave the written confession at issue he
had been warned by a police officer that he need
not answer any questions and that he could not be
compelled to do so. Just before the written state-
ment was taken he was also warned that what he
said would be used against him in court. The
Pennsylvania court concluded that both warnings
could be taken together and that defendant, just
prior to giving the written statement, was aware
19651
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of the full reach of his privilege against self in-
crimination and had intelligently waived it.
The defendant further contended, however, that
before "there can be a valid waiver of the right to
remain silent ... a lawyer must be present, or at
least such assistance intelligently waived. ... "
(Emphasis added.) In answer to this, the court
held that "the right to have a lawyer actually
present during a police investigation is not ab-
solute... [and] such a requirement would be in
direct conflict with other established legal princi-
ples, and beyond the realm of reason and logic."
"If this were the law," the court said, "then it
would logically follow that other equally important
constitutional rights, such as the assistance of
counsel itself could not be waived without a lawyer
being physically present, and ad infinitum. The
absurdity of the resulting consequences is readily
evident."
The court then went on to decide whether an
accused undergoing interrogation which is de-
signed to produce an incriminating statement must
be at least warned of the right to counsel. Escobedo,
decided the court, does not so hold. "The main pur-
pose and true significance of [that] decision is to
guarantee to an accused ... full protection of his
right not to convict himself out of his own mouth."
Since the court had already held that the de-
fendant here was sufficiently aware of his privilege
against self-incrimination, in the court's view,
"what more protection could the assistance of
counsel possibly provide?"
Comment: For a discussion of related cases see
Abstracts of Recent Cases, 56 J. Crim. L., C. &
P.S. 221-222 (1965).
New Jersey Rejects Mere Evidence Rule-
State v. Bisaceia, - A.2d - (N.J.1965). De-
fendant was arrested for armed robbery and,
prior to trial, moved to suppress as evidence a pair
of shoes seized from his apartment under authority
of a search warrant on the ground that since the
shoes were not an "instrumentality" of the offense,
but were "mere evidence" of the offense, the
seizure violated the fourth amendment.
The Supreme Court of New Jersey first noted
that the seizure was authorized by Rule 3:2A-2
of that court which, in addition to authorizing a
search for, and the seizure of, any property "which
has been used in connection with" an offense, also
authorized the seizure of any property "constitut-
ing evidence of or tending to show" any offense.
Although the state and the trial court were of the
view that the shoes were, in fact, instrumentalities
of the offense because "a robber could hardly
pursue his plans in the nude" (see United States v.
Guido, 251 F.2d 1(7th Cir.1958)), the supreme
court rejected this approach and held that the
broad New Jersey rule authorizing the seizure of
evidentiary items not instrumentalities of the crime
was not violative of the fourth amendment.
The court found that earlier federal cases (for
a discussion of the cases see INBAu AND SOWLE,
CASES AND COMMEaNTS ON CRIMINAL JUSTICE
752-753 (2d ed.1964)) which had developed the
theory that the state could not seize personal
property belonging to a defendant which was not
the instrumentality or fruit of an offense were
concerned primarily with the protection of private
papers. Distinguishing these cases, and rejecting
the notion that the "property" rights of a de-
fendant in evidence should prevent its seizure
unless it had been "forfeited" by its use as an
instrumentality of crime, the court declared that
it "is far more palatable to say directly that title
and possession are beyond the point; that the
Fourth Amendment, striking a balance between
the right of the individual suspected of crime and
the duty of the State to protect its citizens, permits
a search for the avowed purpose of finding evidence
with which to convict, so long at least as there is
not involved the evil of the general warrant ...
[and] the unrestricted invasion of the privacy of a
man's papers with which ... [the earlier cases]
were concerned."
The Dorado Rule and Handwriting Samples-
In People v. Graves, -- Cal. Reptr. - (CalApp.
1965), a California appellate court held that hand-
writing samples taken from a defendant during the
accusatory stage of an investigation were the
equivalent of oral admissions of guilt and, hence,
could not be received in evidence under the rule
of People v. Dorado, 398 P.2d 361, unless the
defendant, prior to giving the exemplars, had been
warned of his privilege against self-incrimination
and his right to counsel. The following commen-
tary, by Mr. Ordway Hilton, a New York Ex-
aminer of Question Documents and Police Science
Editor of the Journal concerns the implications of
this decision.
"The recent California decision dealing with the
problem of obtaining specimens of writing from a
criminal suspect after he was charged or suspected
of a crime raises some significant points from the
document examiner's point of view. It is my
recollection that the conviction was set aside at
least in part because the suspect was asked for
[Vol. 56
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further writings and these writings were used to
prove his guilt. This was after the document ex-
aminer had furnished a report suggesting that the
man might have been involved but stating that
more writing was necessary to prove it.
It would seem to me that from the document
examiner's point of view some errors were made.
He evidently had reached an opinion that the
writer in question might be the guilty person, but
actually he was still undecided. Probably his
report should have been simply that with the
writing at hand he could not eliminate the suspect
and he could not identify him. I do not know what
effect this would have had on the court's opinion,
but in all probability, since the additional writings
proved the man guilty, they would have still
frowned on their use by the prosecution.
Writing specimens taken at request, that is
those specimens obtained during an interrogation
when the writer is asked to prepare specimens for
comparison purposes only, are generally not very
satisfactory. However, police examiners have to
use them in a great number of cases. Regardless
of how many times investigators are told that they
must get large quantities of writing of this kind,
they collect very meager samples. These sometimes
clearly eliminate the individual. On a few rare occa-
sions, they thoroughly identify him as the guilty
writer. However, it has been my experience in
cases that I have handled, both prosecution and
defense, that these specimens often have to be
supplemented before any positive opinion can be
reached.
If the courts are going to say that the document
examiner can only use those specimens which are
taken at the very beginning of the investigation,
they are forcing the expert to render opinions that
have a higher probability of error. In many cases
where the suspect has not written the questioned
writing, there are still a number of points of simi-
larity between his writing and that in question.
These are the things that the investigator is sure
proves the man guilty, but regardless of how many
similarities there are in handwriting, one or only a
few repeated significant differences can show that
a man did not do the writing. This generally means
evaluation of apparent divergencies in limited
specimens of handwriting must be made.
In the case at hand, it turned out that the writer
was identified. His additional writings might have
shown that several letters that were "question
marks" were actually repeated points of difference.
I have had this happen in more cases than one. If
you have only one or two examples of a letter or a
letter combination, you cannot tell whether this is
a true difference if it is not exactly like the ques-
tioned writing. Other specimens of the man's
writing may show that sometimes he does it one
way and sometimes does it like the questioned
writing. So you can see that more extensive speci-
mens may be absolutely necessary to get a correct
opinion.
I would say that the limiting factors placed on
the document examiner by the California courts
are going to mean that either the expert will
render an opinion on what he has, and certain less
careful men may well do this when they should not,
or else whatever extra specimens are taken can only
work one way. That one way is to clear the inno-
cent fellow.
Basically judges are attorneys. I find it hard
with the attorney who is unexperienced with hand-
writing problems to make him understand that we
need a great deal of writing.
I have noticed a tendency with judges in cases
where a man will deny his signature on the witness
stand to limit the cross-examiner in how many
times the man should sign his name. If the cross-
examiner knows something about signatures, he
may want to get 10 or 12 specimens, as he should,
but the judge will cut him off after only one or two.
To get around the legal hurdles set up by the
California opinion, it is always possible to get
other writings besides request writings prepared
by the suspect. However, if he is a transient
criminal (and many criminals are constantly on
the move), there may be very little of his writing
in the community or anywhere in the state for that
matter.
To summarize somewhat briefly-for accurate
handwriting opinions, large quantities of hand-
writing are often necessary. Writing taken by
police interrogators and police investigators are
frequently inadequate. For the best administration
of justice, from the point of view of those in my
profession, the handwriting opinion in a criminal
case must be 100 per cent accurate. A cautious and
conscientious examiner may realize after he starts
working on a case that he needs more writing.
This cannot always be anticipated before any
work is done. The courts would do well to make
sure that experts always get the full amount of
writing necessary if they want to protect indi-
viduals from false convictions.
Decisions by some courts that make available
all writings obtained by the prosecution from the
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